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This paper provides an axiomatic approach to the problem of measuring the information
contained in opportunity sets. In many choice situations, the items that can be selected
from an opportunity set (the objects of choice) do not coincide with the consequences
they induce (the objects a decision-maker ultimately cares about). An informational is-
sue arises because uncertainty regarding the consequences of the choices may be present.
An ordinal index of information with a plausible interpretation in this framework is char-
acterized by means of two sets of axioms.
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The problem of ranking opportunity sets in terms of their desirability with respect to
certain individual and social criteria has been the subject of investigation of a growing
body of literature. An opportunity set (or a menu) is dened as a set of options from
which an individual can make choices. In addition to the indirect-utility criterion, which
postulates that an agent ranks opportunity sets on the basis of their respective best
elements according to her or his preferences on the universal set of options, other criteria
have recently been introduced as possible determinants of the desirability of a menu.
For instance, the freedom of choice oered by opportunity sets has been used as a cri-
terion to rank these menus. See, for example, Gravel (1994), Gravel, Laslier, and Trannoy
(1998), Klemisch-Ahlert (1993), Pattanaik and Xu (1990), Puppe (1995, 1996, 1998), Sen
(1988, 1991) for discussions and axiomatic analyses of freedom of choice. The assessment
of distributions of opportunities has been analyzed in Kranich (1996). Pattanaik and Xu
(1997) discuss the importance of diversity as a ranking criterion. Rankings of opportu-
nity sets in terms of the overall well-being of an agent rather than in terms of one specic
criterion are analyzed in Bossert (1997a), Bossert, Pattanaik, and Xu (1994), and Dutta
and Sen (1996). Kreps (1979) provides an approach in terms of preference for ﬂexibility.
The purpose of this paper is to propose and explore a new avenue of research within
this context. In particular, the ranking of opportunity sets is analyzed from an angle
which is quite dierent from those mentioned above|namely, the informational contents
of opportunity sets are the subject of investigation. To illustrate why informational issues
may be of importance in this framework, consider the following example, taken from Sen
(1993). There are two alternative choice situations faced by an individual decision-maker.
Suppose rst the decision-maker is oered a choice between accepting the invitation of
a distant acquaintance for a cup of tea at the acquaintance's place or staying at home.
That is, the decision-maker can choose an option from the opportunity set consisting
of the two alternatives `having tea at the acquaintance's place' and `staying at home.'
Alternatively, suppose the acquaintance oers having some cocaine at her or his place
as a further option, in which case the decision-maker faces the larger opportunity set
which contains, in addition to the two above-mentioned options, the element `having
cocaine at the acquaintance's place.' Sen (1993) argues that it is quite plausible that
many decision-makers would accepted the invitation to tea in the rst choice situation
but select `staying at home' when faced with the second, and he uses this example to
argue against the traditional rational-choice model based on what he refers to as internal
1consistency requirements imposed on choice behaviour.
An alternative interpretation of this example seems to be to view the objects that ap-
pear as menu items in an opportunity set as being dierent from the objects the decision-
maker ultimately cares about|the consequences of his or her choices. For example, it
would seem natural to think of the consequences `having tea at a place where cocaine is
being consumed' and `having tea at a cocaine-free place' as being distinct alternatives, and
the choice behaviour outlined above can be explained quite straightforwardly once it is
recognized that if `having tea' and `staying at home' are the only menu items available for
choice, the decision-maker lacks crucial information regarding the possible consequences
of her or his actions. In this case, the agent does not know with certainty whether the
consequence of choosing tea will be `having tea at a cocaine-free place' or `having tea
at a place where cocaine is being consumed.' On the other hand, if `having cocaine' is
oered as an additional menu item, the agent can be sure that choosing `tea' will lead to
the latter of those two consequences. Thus, a menu can convey crucial information about
the consequences of possible choices. See also Sen's (1993) discussion of the epistemic
value of a menu, and Bossert (1995b) for alternative denitions and characterizations of
rationality in situations where possible consequences do not coincide with menu items.
It is clear that the distinction between choices and consequences is of importance in a
variety of decision situations and is, therefore, not restricted to the above example. This
observation raises an interesting measurement issue, namely, how the informational con-
tents of opportunity sets should be measured. Basically, the reason why the informational
contents may vary considerably across dierent opportunity sets is that, in many situa-
tions, uncertainty concerning the possible consequences of choosing particular menu items
is present. This measurementproblem is addressed in the present paper. In particular, the
objective is to establish an index that can be applied to measure the informational con-
tents of opportunity sets. Given an ordinal interpretation of such a measure, this amounts
to the construction of an ordering on the set of possible menus with the above-mentioned
interpretation.
The following is a brief outlineof the model employedin this paper in order to illustrate
the methodology being used; a more detailed description follows after introducing the req-
uisite formal denitions. For any given menu, the set of possible consequences is specied
for each menu item. A plausible interpretation of these sets of possible consequences is
that they contain all those outcomes that cannot be excluded as possible consequences
of the choice of a particular menu item. Based on this mapping from choices into con-
sequences, an ordering dened on the set of possible menus is to be established. The
2approach employed to do so is axiomatic, and two characterizations of a specic rank-
ing of opportunity sets are provided. This ordering compares two menus on the basis of
the total number of possible consequences from all possible choices minus the number of
elements of the menu.
The above-described index can be dened on the basis of the sets of possible con-
sequences alone. No information regarding, for example, how an agent ranks dierent
outcomes is required, which is a plausible property, given that what is to be measured
is the information contained in menus rather than, for example, the quality of the best
possible choice or the overall desirability of these menus. Furthermore, there is no need
to assume the existence of a probability distribution over the set of possible outcomes
that can arise from the choice of a given menu item. In that regard, the model used in
this paper is analogous to a class of nonprobabilistic models of choice under uncertainty.
See, for example, Bandyopadhyay (1988), Bossert (1989a,b, 1997b), Barber a, Barrett, and
Pattanaik (1984), Barber a and Pattanaik (1984), Fishburn (1984), Heiner and Packard
(1984), Holzman (1984a,b), Kannai and Peleg (1984), Nitzan and Pattanaik (1984), Pat-
tanaik and Peleg (1984), and some of the contributions to the literature on choice under
ignorance|for instance, Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) and Maskin (1979). An approach to
the ranking of sets of alternatives based on signed orders is discussed in Fishburn (1992),
and Bossert (1995a) analyzes the ranking of sets of outcomes with a xed number of
elements.
However, it should be pointed out that the problem addressed in this paper diers from
the standard approach to the ranking sets of possible outcomes in terms of uncertainty.
Instead of simply ranking sets of possible outcomes as is the case in nonprobabilisitc
decision models, the approach in this paper establishes a ranking of non-ordered n-tuples
of sets of consequences (where n is not xed), due to the fact that each menu item in a
given opportunity set induces a set of possible outcomes. As a consequence, the axioms
employed in this paper and the resulting ranking rules are quite dierent from those that
can be found in the standard decision-theoretic literature on nonprobabilistic choice under
uncertainty.
In Section 2, the basic concepts and denitions used in this paper are introduced. The
consequences of some basic axioms on the comparison of menus with a xed number of
elements are analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 provides two characterizations of the index
proposed in this paper, and Section 5 establishes the independence of the axioms used in
the axiomatizations. Concluding remarks are collected in Section 6.
32 Denitions
The set of real numbers is denoted by <.L e tZ +(resp. Z++) be the set of nonnegative
(resp. positive) integers, and let Zn
+ (resp. Zn
++)d e n o t et h en -fold Cartesian product of
Z+ (resp. Z++). For n 2Z ++, 1n is the vector consisting of n ones. The notation for
vector inequalities is as follows. For all n 2Z ++ and all x;y 2Z n
+,xyif and only if
xi  yi for all i 2f 1 ;:::;ng,a n dx>yif and only if x  y and x 6= y.F o rn2Z ++,
x 2Z n







xi +1 i fi=j;
x i if i 2f 1 ;:::;ngnf jg :
Consider an innite set of items that could appear on a menu, denoted by . ()
is the set of all nonempty and nite subsets of . That is, a menu S available to an
agent is an element of (). The cardinality of S is denoted by jSj and, for notational
convenience, the elements of S are labelled s1;:::;s jSj,t h a ti s ,S=f s 1;:::;s jSjg.
The set of possible consequences that are of relevance for a decision-maker is Ω. Again,
Ω is assumed to have innitely many elements. (Ω) is the set of all nonempty and nite
subsets of Ω. For n 2Z ++,Γ n(Ω) is the set of all non-ordered n-tuples of nonempty and
nite subsets of Ω.
To establish a link between choices of menu items and consequences, a mapping
F:() !
S
n2Z++ Γn(Ω) is used, where, for all S 2 (), F(S) 2 ΓjSj(Ω). There-
fore, F(S) can be written as F(S)=<F 1( S) ;:::;F jSj(S)> with Fi(S) 2 (Ω) for all
i 2f 1 ;:::;jSjg. For all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSjg, Fi(S) is the set of possible consequences of choos-
ing menu item si from the menu S.N o t et h a tF ( S )i sanon-ordered n-tuple because the
numbering of elements in S is arbitrary.
It is assumed that F is surjective, that is, F(()) =
S
n2Z++ Γn(Ω). The surjectivity
of F ensures that any non-ordered n-tuple of sets of possible consequences can be gener-
ated by some menu. This assumption is required in order to rule out degenerate cases.
See Section 5 for a more detailed discussion.
The measurement issue addressed in this paper is that of nding an index of the
information contained in a menu S. Given an ordinal interpretation of such an index, this
amounts to establishing an ordering R on () where, for all S;T 2 (), SRT if and
only if S contains at least as much information about consequences as T. The indierence
relation and the strict preference relation corresponding to R are denoted by I and P,
respectively.
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R  ranks two opportunity sets on the basis of the total number of possible consequences
generated by the respective menu, corrected by the number of elements appearing in the
menu. This ordering has considerable intuitive appeal. The total number of possible
consequences appears to be an adequate measure of the uncertainty involved in the choice
to be made. Because a menu item the choice of which unambiguously leads to one specic
consequence does not introduce any uncertainty, this total number of consequences should
be modied by subtracting the number of menu items. It turns out that, in addition
to conforming to the intuition behind this measurement issue, R can be given strong
axiomatic support. In particular, R turns out to be the only information-measurement
ordering satisfying two sets of plausible axioms.
3 A Fixed Number of Menu Items
As a rst step in the characterizations of R, the consequences of some axioms imposing
restrictions on the comparison of menus of the same cardinality are examined.
The rst axiom is a certainty indierence condition. It requires that if each menu item
in two opportunity sets of the same cardinality leads to a single possible outcome, then
the two menus should be declared indierent. This is a plausible assumption: if there is
no uncertainty regarding the consequences of all possible choices in two opportunity sets,
the two menus are indistinguishable in terms of their informational contents.
Certainty Indierence: For all S;T 2 () such that jSj = jTj,i fj F i ( S ) j=1f o ra l l
i2f 1 ;:::;jSjg and jFi(T)j =1f o ra l li2f 1 ;:::;jTjg,t h e nSIT.
The next axiom is an independence condition. It requires that if two menus S and
T with the same cardinality are replaced by S0 and T 0, respectively, where the only
dierence between the former pair and the latter is that one outcome is added as a
possible consequence of a choice sj and a choice tj for some j 2f 1 ;:::;jSjg, then the
relative ranking of S and T is the same as the relative ranking of S0 and T 0.T h i st y p e
of condition is standard in the literature on the ranking of opportunity sets in terms
of freedom of choice and the ranking of sets of uncertain outcomes (see, for example,
Barber a, Barrett, and Pattanaik (1984), Barber a and Pattanaik (1984), Bossert (1989a,b),
5Bossert, Pattanaik, and Xu (1994), Fishburn (1984), Heiner and Packard (1984), Kannai
and Peleg (1984), and Pattanaik and Xu (1990)). The following axiom is an adaptation
of this principle to the problem investigated in the present paper.
Independence: For all S;T;S0;T0 2 () such that jSj = jS0j = jTj = jT 0j, for all
j 2f 1 ;:::;jSjg, for all ! 2 Ω n (Fj(S) [ Fj(T)), if
Fj(S0)=F j( S )[f !g and Fj(T 0)=F j( T)[f !g and
Fi(S0)=F i( S ) for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSj gnf jg and
Fi(T 0)=F i( T) for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jTjgn fjg;
then
SRT , S 0RT0:
In the presence of the above axioms, the task of comparing any two opportunity sets
S and T on the basis of their informational contents can be simplied considerably. Cer-




(with indierence relation  and strict preference relation ) such that the relative rank-
ing of S and T according to R is determined by the ranking of the vectors consisting of
the cardinalities of the Fi(S)a n dF i( T) according to . In addition, the ordering  must
possess certain properties and, in turn, the existence of an ordering of vectors of positive
integers with these properties guarantees that the corresponding ordering R satises cer-
tainty indierence and independence. The above-mentioned properties of the ordering 
are the following.
Anonymity: For all n 2Z ++, for all x;y 2Z n
++, for all bijections :f1;:::;ng!
f 1 ;:::;ng,i fy i=x  ( i )for all i 2f 1 ;:::;ng,t h e nxy .
Additivity: For all n 2Z ++, for all x;y 2Z n
++, for all j 2f 1 ;:::;ng,
x  y , ^ x j  ^ y
j:
By repeated application of this property, additivity is easily seen to be equivalent to the
following axiom.
Additivity0: For all n 2Z ++, for all x;y 2Z n
++, for all z 2Z n
+,
xy , ( x+z )( y+z ) :
The above-described result establishing the consequences of certainty indierence and
independence is stated in the following theorem.
6Theorem 1 Suppose F is surjective. R satises certainty indierence and independence




that, for all S;T 2 (),
SRT , ( j F 1( S) j ;:::;jF jSj(S)j)  (jF 1(T)j;:::;jF jTj(T)j): (1)
The following lemma will be of use in the proof of this theorem.
Lemma 1 Suppose F is surjective, and R satises certainty indierence and indepen-
dence. Let S;T 2 () be such that jSj = jTj. If, for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSjg, there exists
j(i) 2f 1 ;:::;jTjg such that jFi(S)j = jFj(i)(T)j, then SIT.
Proof: Let S;T 2 () be such that jSj = jTj, and suppose that, for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSjg,
there exists j(i) 2f 1 ;:::;jTjg such that jFi(S)j = jFj(i)(T)j. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can assume that j(i)=ifor all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSjg because the labelling of the
elements in S and T is irrelevant. We proceed by induction over
PjSj
i=1 jFi(S)j.N o t et h a t
P j S j
i =1 jFi(S)j =
PjTj
i=1 jFi(T)j by assumption. The methodology employed in this proof is
analogous to the one used in Pattanaik and Xu's (1990) characterization of the simple
cardinality-based ordering for opportunity sets.
The smallest possible value of the above sum is jSj because each Fi(S)c o n t a i n sa tl e a s t
one element. In that case, Fi(S)a n dF i ( T ) must be singletons for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSjg =
f1;:::;jTjg. By certainty indierence, SIT.
Now suppose the claim is true for
PjSj
i=1 jFi(S)j = m j S j .L e t
P j S j
i =1 jFi(S)j = m +1
and jFi(S)j = jFi(T)j for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSjg.C h o o s ej2f 1 ;:::;jSjg such that jFj(S)j =
jFj(T)j > 1. Such a j must exist because m +1>j Sj .P i c ka n y!2F j ( S )a n dl e tS 0be
such that jS0j = jSj, Fj(S0)=F j( S )nf!gand Fi(S0)=F i( S ) for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSjgnfjg
(note that the surjectivity of F guarantees that such a menu S0 exists). There are two
possible cases.
(i) ! 2 Fj(T);
(ii) ! 62 Fj(T).
In case (i), let T 0 be such that jT0j = jTj, Fj(T0)=F j( T)nf ! g ,a n dF i( T 0 )=F i( T)
for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jTjg.W eh a v e
j F i ( S
0 ) j=j F i ( T










i=1 jFi(T 0)j = m. By the induction hypothesis, S0IT0,a n d
independence implies SIT.
Now consider case (ii). Because ! 62 Fj(T)a n dj F j ( S ) j=j F j ( T ) j , it follows that
Fj(T) n Fj(S) 6= ;.L e t! 02 F j ( T ) n F j ( S ). Let T 1 be such that jT1j = jTj, Fj(T1)=
F j( T ) nf! 0g,a n dF i( T 1)=F i( T) for all j 2f 1 ;:::;jT1jgnfjg. It follows that jFj(S0)j =
jFj(T 1)j = jFj(S)j−1=j F j ( T ) j−1a n d
P j S 0 j
i =1 jFi(S0)j =
PjT 1j
i=1 jFi(T 1)j = m.B y t h e
induction hypothesis,
S0 IT1: (2)
Letting T 2 be such that jT2j = jTj, Fj(T2)=F j( T 1)[f ! g=( F j( T)nf ! 0g )[f ! g ,a n d
F i( T 2 )=F i( T1)=F i( T) for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jT2jg, (2) and independence imply
SIT
2: (3)
Consider any !00 2 Fj(T 1), and dene T 3 such that jT 3j = jTj, Fj(T 3)=F j( T 2)nf ! 00g,
and Fi(T 3)=F i ( T ) for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jT3jg. Furthermore, let T 4 be such that jT4j =
jTj, Fj(T4)=F j ( T )nf ! 00g,a n dF i ( T 4 )=F i ( T ) for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jT4jg n fjg.B y
denition, Fj(T 3)=( F j( T1) [f!g)nf!00g. Furthermore, jFj(T 3)j = jFj(T 4)j = jFj(T 1)j =
jFj(T)j−1, jFi(T 3)j = jFi(T 4)j = jFi(T)j for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jTjg,a n d
P j T 3 j
i =1 jFi(T 3)j =
PjT 4j
i=1 jFi(T 4)j = m. By the induction hypothesis, T 3 IT4, and independence implies
T 2IT. Together with (3), the transitivity of R implies SIT.
Proof of Theorem 1: It is straightforward to verify that any ordering R that can be
expressed in terms of an anonymous and additive ordering  as in the theorem statement
satises certainty indierence and independence.




++ with the desired properties is constructed. Let f!i j i 2Z ++g be a
countably innite set of pairwise distinct elements of Ω. For all n;m 2Z ++, x 2Z n
++,
and y 2Z m
++,l e tS x;T y 2() be such that jSxj = n, jTyj = m, Fi(Sx)=f ! 1;:::;! x ig
for all i 2f 1 ;:::;ng,a n dF i ( T y )=f ! 1 ;:::;! y ig for all i 2f 1 ;:::;mg (the existence
of menus Sx and Ty with these properties is guaranteed by the surjectivity of F). Now
dene  by letting, for all n;m 2Z ++, x 2Z n
++,a n dy2Z m
++,
x  y :, Sx RT y:
is an ordering because R is. For all S;T 2 (), let xS := (jF1(S)j;:::;jF jSj(S)j)2Z
j S j
++
and yT := (jF1(T)j;:::;jF jTj(T)j)2Z
j Tj
++. By Lemma 1 and the denition of ,
SRT , S x SRT yT , x
S  y
T , (jF 1(S)j;:::;jF jSj(S)j)  (jF 1(T)j;:::;jF jTj(T)j):
8That  is anonymous follows from the observation that the labelling of the elements
in a menu is arbitrary.
It remains to be shown that  is additive. Let n 2Z ++, x;y 2Z n
++,a n dj2
f 1 ;:::;ng.C h o o s e S;T 2 () such that jSj = jTj = n, jFi(S)j = xi for all i 2
f1;:::;ng,a n dj F i( T) j=y ifor all i 2f 1 ;:::;ng.P i c ka n y!2Ω n ( F j ( S ) [ F j ( T )), and
let S0;T02() be such that jS0j = jT 0j = n, Fj(S0)=F j( S )[f!g,Fj(T0)=F j( T) [f!g,
Fi(S0)=F i( S ) for all i 2f 1 ;:::;ngnfjg,a n dF i( T 0)=F i( T) for all i 2f 1 ;:::;ngnfjg.
By independence and the denition of ,
x  y , SRT , S
0RT
0 , ^ x
j  ^ y
j:
Theorem 1 implies that, in the presence of certainty indierence and independence, we
can simplify matters by considering the ordering  instead of R without loss of generality.
In particular, the ordering  on
S
n2Z++ Zn
++ corresponding to R is dened by letting,
for all n;m 2Z ++, x 2Z n










For each of the axioms imposed on R in this paper (in addition to certainty indierence
and independence), an equivalent formulation in terms of  can be dened, and charac-
terizations of an ordering R can be provided by characterizing the corresponding ordering
.
To conclude this section, a plausible expansion monotonicity property is introduced,
and the class of orderings satisfying this axiom in addition to certainty indierence and
independence is characterized. Expansion monotonicity requires that if a menu T diers
from a menu S only in that some Fj(T) contains all elements in Fj(S) and one further
element ! (all other sets of possible consequences being the same for S and T), then T
must be worse than S. This is a very weak requirement and is motivated by the argument
that the additional possible consequence that is present in T leads to a higher degree of
uncertainty and, thus, to a lower degree of information about consequences.
Expansion Monotonicity: For all S;T 2 () such that jSj = jTj,i ft h e r ee x i s t
j2f 1 ;:::;jSjg and ! 2 Ω nFj(S) such that Fj(T)=F j( S )[f!gand Fi(T)=F i( S )f o r
all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSjgn fjg,t h e n
SPT:
As is the case for certainty indierence and independence, expansion monotonicity only
imposes a restriction on the ranking of menus with a xed number of elements.
9Adding expansion monotonicity to certainty indierence and independence, we obtain
a characterization of the class of orderings R that rank any two menus of xed cardinality
on the basis of the total number of possible consequences. Before stating and proving this
result, the property of  corresponding to expansion monotonicity is dened.
Monotonicity: For all n 2Z ++, for all x;y 2Z n
++,i fx<y ,t h e nxy .
The proof of the following lemma is straightforward and omitted.
Lemma 2 Suppose F is surjective, and R satises certainty indierence and indepen-
dence. Let  be the corresponding ordering introduced in Theorem 1. R satises expansion
monotonicity if and only if  satises monotonicity.
We obtain
Theorem 2 Suppose F is surjective. R satises certainty indierence, independence, and




++ such that (1) is satised for all S;T 2 () and, for all S;T 2 ()








Proof: That any ordering R satisfying (4) satises certainty indierence, independence,
and expansion monotonicity can be veried easily (note that none of these properties
imposes any restriction on the comparison of menus of dierent cardinalities).
Now suppose R satises these axioms. By Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, it follows that
 is well-dened and satises anonymity, additivity, and monotonicity. It is sucient to














yi ) x  y: (6)
If n = 1, (5) follows from reﬂexivity and (6) follows from monotonicity. Now suppose
n  2.
To prove (5), let x;y 2Z n




i=1 yi. Dene zn := n
Pn
i=1 xi,
z1 := xn−y1+zn and, if n  3, zk := xk−1−yk+zk−1 for all k 2f 2 ;:::;n−1g. It follows
that z 2Z n
++, xn + zn = y1 + z1,a n dx k+z k=y k +1 + zk+1 for all k 2f 1 ;:::;n−1g.
10Therefore, because  is anonymous, (x + z)  (y + z) and, by additivity0 (which is
equivalent to additivity), we obtain x  y.
To show that (6) is true, suppose x;y 2Z n




i=1 yi.L e t
x 0:= (
Pn
i=1 xi − (n − 1);1n−1)a n dy 0:= (
Pn
i=1 yi − (n − 1);1n−1). By (5), x0  x and
y0  y. Monotonicity implies x0  y0 and, hence, x  y.
An interesting feature of Theorem 2 is that the independence property implies that
the restriction of R to menus of a xed cardinality can be represented by the sum of the
cardinalities of the sets of possible consequences generated by a menu. Note that this is a
quitestrong conclusion|not only an additivelyseparable representationis impliedbut full
additivity. Furthermore, unlike in the usual characterizations of additive functions, the
domain of a representation of R is a discrete set, which explains why the proof technique
employed in the above theorem diers from the usual separability arguments that are
commonly used when characterizing representations with Euclidean spaces as domains.
4 Two Characterizations of R
Theorem 2 can be extended to obtain a characterization of R by strengthening certainty
indierence and independence appropriately. All that is needed is to require the conclu-
sions of these axioms to be satised not only for comparisons involving menus with a xed
number of items but for menus of arbitrary cardinality. Accordingly, extended certainty
indierence is dened as follows.
Extended certainty indierence: For all S;T 2 (), if jFi(S)j =1f o ra l li2
f 1 ;:::;jSjg and jFi(T)j =1f o ra l li2f 1 ;:::;jTjg,t h e nSIT.
Extended certainty indierence is as plausible an axiom as certainty indierence. If there
is no uncertainty associated with any of the choices that can be made in two menus, the
informational contents of these menus should be the same. Note that, in conjunction with
expansion monotonicity, this also implies that the informational contents are maximal for
menus that only generate singletons of possible consequences which, again, is a very
natural property for an index of information.
Analogously, extended independence requires the relative ranking of any two menus
to be invariant with respect to additions of a possible consequence to the set of possible
consequences of choosing one specic menu item in each.
11Extended independence: For all S;T;S0;T02() such that jSj = jS0j and jTj = jT 0j,
for all j 2f 1 ;:::;minfjSj;jTjgg, for all ! 2 Ω n (Fj(S) [ Fj(T)), if
Fj(S0)=F j( S )[f !g and Fj(T 0)=F j( T)[f !g and
Fi(S0)=F i( S ) for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSj gnf jg and
Fi(T 0)=F i( T) for all i 2f 1 ;:::;jTjgn fjg;
then
SRT , S 0RT0:
The corresponding properties of the ordering  are the following.
Unity Indierence: For all n;m 2Z ++, 1n  1m.
Extended additivity: For all n;m 2Z ++, for all x 2Z n
++, for all y 2Z m
++, for all
j 2f 1 ;:::;minfn;mgg,
x  y , ^ xj  ^ yj:
The following lemma is immediate and is stated without a proof.
Lemma 3 Suppose F is surjective, and R satises certainty indierence and indepen-
dence. Let  be the corresponding ordering introduced in Theorem 1.
(a) R satises extended certainty indierence if and only if  satises unity indierence.
(b) R satises extended independence if and only if  satises extended additivity.
The following theorem provides the rst characterization of R.
Theorem 3 Suppose F is surjective. R satises expansion monotonicity, extended cer-
tainty indierence, and extended independence if and only if R = R.
Proof: It is straighforward to verify that R satises the required axioms. Conversely,
suppose R is an ordering satisfying the axioms in the theorem statement. Again,  is
well-dened and must satisfy anonymity, monotonicity, unity indierence, and extended
additivity, and it is sucientto show that =.L e tn;m 2Z ++, x 2Z n
++ and y 2Z m
++.








xi − (n − 1)
!
 x: (7)
Now suppose n  2. By unity indierence, 11  1n. Repeated application of extended
additivity yields (
Pn
i=1 xi −(n−1))  (
Pn
i=1 xi −(n−1);1n−1). By the xed-cardinality
12result of Theorem 2, (
Pn
i=1 xi − (n − 1);1n−1)  x. Hence, by transitivity, (
Pn
i=1 xi −
(n − 1))  x. Therefore, (7) must be true for any value of n.
Analogously, it follows that (
Pm
i=1 yi − (m − 1))  y. Therefore, using monotonicity,
x  y ,
  n X
i=1
xi − (n − 1)
!

  m X
i=1





xi − (n − 1) 
m X
i=1









There is an interesting alternative to strengthening independence in order to arrive
at a characterization of R. Consider the following situation involving two menus S and
T. Suppose S and T are such that T contains one more element than S,t h es e t so f
possible consequences generated by the rst jSj items are identical in S and in T,a n dt h e
additional element in T generates an outcome with certainty. In that case, the additional
element in T does not introduce any further uncertainty as compared to S and, from an
informational viewpoint, it seems natural to consider S and T to be indierent. This is
captured in the following certainty extension condition.
Certainty extension: For all S;T 2 () such that jTj = jSj +1 ,i fF i( T)=F i( S )f o r
all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSjg and jFjTj(T)j =1 ,t h e nSIT.
The corresponding property of  is the following extension axiom.
Extension: For all n 2Z ++, for all x 2Z n
++, x  (x;1).
Certainty extension is a strengthening of extended certainty indierence. This is shown
in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Suppose F is surjective. If R satises certainty extension, then R satises
extended certainty indierence.
Proof: Suppose S;T 2 () are such that jFi(S)j =1f o ra l li2f 1 ;:::;jSjg and
jFi(T)j =1f o ra l li2f 1 ;:::;jTjg.L e t S 0 ;S0;T0 2 () be such that jS0j =2 ,j S 0 j=
j T 0 j=1 ,F ( S 0 )=<F 1( S ) ;F 1(T)>, F(S0)=<F 1( S )> ,a n dF ( T 0 )=<F 1( T)> .
By certainty extension, S0 IS 0 and S0 IT0. Therefore, S0 IT0. Repeated application of
certainty extension yields SIS 0 and TIT 0. Therefore, by transitivity, SIT.
It is straightforward to verifythat extension isthe property of  corresponding to certainty
extension. This observation is stated in the following lemma, the proof of which is omitted.
13Lemma 5 Suppose F is surjective, and R satises certainty indierence and indepen-
dence. Let  be the corresponding ordering introduced in Theorem 1. R satises certainty
extension if and only if  satises extension.
The following result provides an alternative characterization of R.
Theorem 4 Suppose F is surjective. R satises independence, expansion monotonicity,
and certainty extension if and only if R = R.
Proof: That R satises the axioms is straightforward. Again, we can consider  instead
of R in order to simplify exposition. Suppose  satises anonymity, additivity, mono-
tonicity, and extension. Let n;m 2Z ++, x 2Z n
++,a n dy2Z m
++.T h e c a s e n = m is
taken care of in Theorem 2. Suppose n 6= m. Without loss of generality, let n>m .B y
repeated application of extension, y  (y;1n−m). Therefore,
x  y , x  (y;1n−m): (8)
Using Theorem 2,






yi +( n−m ) ,
n X
i =1




and, using (8), it follows that =.
5 Independence of the Axioms
Before establishing the independence of the axioms imposed on R in the above charac-
terization results, it is shown that the surjectivity of F is essential. Suppose F is such
that, for all S 2 () and all i 2f 1 ;:::;jSjg, jFi(S)j = 2. In that case, the universal
indierence relation (the relation that declares all elements of () pairwise indierent)
satises all of the axioms introduced in this paper. Note that the only axiom that requires
a strict preference to be established between any two menus is expansion monotonicity,
which is vacuously satised if F only generates non-ordered n-tuples of sets of possible
outcomes with cardinality two.
To establish the independence of the axioms used in Theorem 2, consider the following
examples.





j A j if  ! 62 A;
jAj +1 i f !2A
14for all A 2 (Ω). Now dene the ordering R1 on () by letting, for all S;T 2 (),







R1 satises independence and expansion monotonicity but violates certainty indierence.










2 −j Tj :
This ordering satises certainty indierence and expansion monotonicity but violates in-
dependence.
The universal indierence relation on () satises certainty indierence and inde-
pendence but violates expansion monotonicity.
Now consider Theorem 3.









This ordering satises expansion monotonicity and extended independence but violates
extended certainty indierence (note that certainty indierence is satised by this exam-
ple).
Dene, for all S;T 2 (),











R4 satises extended certainty indierence and expansion monotonicity but violates ex-
tended independence. Independence is satised.
Again, the universal indierence relation can be used to establish that expansion
monotonicity is not implied by the other axioms used in Theorem 3.
Finally, the independence of the axioms used in Theorem 4 is established.
The relation R2 satises expansion monotonicity and certainty extension but violates
independence.
The universal indierence relation satises independence and certainty extension but
violates expansion monotonicity.
The relation R4 satises independence and expansion monotonicity but violates cer-
tainty extension (note that extended certainty indierence is satised).
156 Concluding Remarks
There is an interesting formal connection between the relation R and critical-level util-
itarian social-evaluation principles that can be used to assess policies with population
consequences. Critical-level utilitarianism declares a state of the world  A at least as good






[^ ui −]( 9 )
where  N (resp. ^ N) is the set of individuals alive in  A (resp. ^ A), the  ui and ^ ui are the
individual lifetime utilities of those alive in the respective state, and  2<is a critical
level of lifetime utility. The critical level is interpreted as that level of utility which, if
experienced by an additional individual, leads to a state that is indierent to the inital
state, provided none of the existing individuals are aected by this population augmen-
tation. See, for example, Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1995) and Blackorby and
Donaldson (1984) for discussions of critical-level utilitarian social-evaluation principles.
(9) can be rewritten as
X
i2  N
 ui −j Nj 
X
i 2^ N
^ u i−j^ Nj 
and, therefore, the inverse relation of R has the same formal structure as critical-level
utilitarianism with a critical level of  = 1. Despite this formal similarity, there are
important dierences between these criteria that should be pointed out. Whereas the
critical level in (9) is an ethical parameter the choice of which is by no means an obvious
task, the corresponding value of one in the denition of R comes about very naturally
by considering the interpretation of R as a ranking of non-ordered n-tuples of sets of
possible outcomes in a choice situation. Furthermore, the set of possible utility values
is usually assumed to be the set <, whereas the set of objects to be ranked by R is
a discrete set, which makes the proof techniques employed in axiomatizations of these
rankings very dierent. In addition, the standard axiomatizations in population ethics
usually provide characterizations of a more general class of orderings, namely, critical-level
generalized utilitarian rules, which allow for an increasing and continuous transformation
to be applied to all utility numbers. In contrast, the independence condition used in the
characterizations of R generate additivity rather than merely additive separability. As a
technical note, the extension axiom used in the proof of Theorem 4 is akin to Blackorby
and Donaldson's (1984) critical-level population principle.
The above-described relationship between the ordering characterized in this paper and
16the critical-level utilitarian population principles suggests that there is further scope for
connections to be made across those dierent areas of research.
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